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Abstract 
Since policy makers often prefer to think in terms of alternative scenarios, the question 
has arisen as to whether it is possible to make conditional population forecasts in a 
probabilistic context. This paper shows that it is both possible and useful to make these 
forecasts. We do this with two different kinds of examples. The first is the probabilistic 
analog of deterministic scenario analysis. Conditional probabilistic scenario analysis is 
essential for policy makers because it allows them to answer “what if” type questions 
properly when outcomes are uncertain. The second is a new category that we call 
“future jump-off date forecasts”. Future jump-off date forecasts are valuable because 
they show policy makers the likelihood that crucial features of today’s forecasts will 
also be present in forecasts made in the future. 
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Conditional Probabilistic Population Forecasting 
Warren C. Sanderson, Sergei Scherbov, Brian C. O’Neill, and Wolfgang Lutz 
Introduction 
The last decade and a half has witnessed rapid development in the area of probabilistic 
population forecasting (see Alho 1990, 1997; Alho and Spencer 1985; Keilman et al. 
2002; Lee 1999; Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994; Lutz et al. 1996, 1997, 2001; Lutz and 
Scherbov 1998; and Pflaumer 1988, among others). A probabilistic forecast goes 
beyond a traditional deterministic one by providing an integrated estimate of the 
forecast’s uncertainty, often a crucial quantity for decision makers. These forecasts give 
distributions of outcomes rather than single numbers resulting from alternative 
scenarios. Since policy makers often prefer to think in terms of alternative scenarios (for 
example, outcomes with and without a certain policy), the question has arisen as to 
whether it is possible to make conditional forecasts in a probabilistic context. 
This paper answers that question by demonstrating how to obtain conditional 
probabilistic population forecasts. We do this with two different kinds of examples. The 
first is the probabilistic analog of deterministic scenarios and the second is a new 
category that we call “future jump-off date forecasts”. Both are important for policy 
analysis. 
Scenario analysis is essential for policy makers because it allows them to answer 
“what if” type questions. For example, they may want to know what the age structure of 
their country would be in fifty years if fertility were lower than in the official 
projections. Future jump-off date forecasts are valuable because they help in answering 
questions about the value of waiting to learn about how the future is unfolding. For 
example, a country may be deciding on whether to build up a retirement fund for its 
citizens. The decision could be made to raise taxes now or to wait ten years to improve 
its projections of future population aging. Future jump-off date forecasts allow us to 
assess how much uncertainty about the future is likely to be resolved by waiting. 
In the following section, we briefly discuss the probabilistic forecasting 
methodology used in Lutz et al. (2001). It is the basis for the quantitative examples in 
the next two sections. We discuss the probabilistic counterpart of traditional scenario 
analysis, and then we present a first look at future jump-off date forecasts. The last 
section contains some concluding thoughts. 
An Introduction to the Methodology 
Creating population forecasts from an initial distribution of the population by age and 
sex and forecasts of total fertility rates (TFR), life expectancies at birth, and net 
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migration rates is a widely accepted procedure. Probabilistic population forecasts differ 
from deterministic forecasts in that they quantify the uncertainty of the course of future 
rates and therefore must specify future total fertility rates, life expectancies, and net 
migration rates as distributions and not as points. Distributions can also be used to 
quantify other uncertainties such as those relating to the base population size. 
In order to generate the required distributions, Lutz et al. (2001) let v be the total 
fertility rate, the change in life expectancy at birth, or net migration to be forecasted for 
periods 1 through T and vt be its forecasted value at time t. The forecasted value, vt , can 
be expressed as the sum of two terms, its trend (mean) at time t, tv , and its deviation 
from the mean at time t, εt. In other words, ttt vv ε+= , where εt is the idiosyncratic 
noise. The tv  were chosen based on the arguments given in Lutz et al. (1994, 1996) and 
updated based on subsequent information. The εt term is assumed to be a normally 
distributed random variable with mean zero and standard deviation σ(εt). The σ(εt) are 
also based on arguments from the same sources. 
Because of the persistence of the factors represented by the εt, we would 
generally expect them to be autocorrelated. One of the most commonly used methods of 
specifying how the εt term evolves over time is the simple autoregressive formation 
(AR(1)), where ttt u+⋅= −1εαε , where ut is an independently distributed normal 
random variable with mean zero and standard deviation σ(u). Another commonly used 
method is the moving average formation of order q, MA(q) where q is the number of 
lagged terms in the moving average. We use the following moving average 
specification: ∑
=
−
⋅=
q
i
itit u
0
αε , where ut-i are independently distributed standard normal 
random variables. To ensure that the standard deviation of εt is equal to its prespecified 
value, ( )
1+
=
q
t
i
εσ
α .   
The choice between AR(1) and MA(q) does not have to do with estimation, but 
rather with representation. Data do not exist that would allow the estimation of the 
parameters of either specification at the regional level used in Lutz et al. (2001). Neither 
is more theoretically correct than the other. Both are just approximations to a far more 
complex reality. When comparably parameterized, they produce very similar 
distributions of εt  
The choice between the two, therefore, rests on which more accurately reflects 
arguments concerning the future. From our perspective, the moving average approach 
has the advantage that the σ(εt) terms appear explicitly making it easier to translate ideas 
about the future into that specification. 
The future levels of vital rates can be correlated in different ways. Most 
important are (a) the correlations between deviations from assumed average trends in 
fertility and mortality rates, (b) the autocorrelation of deviations within each series of 
vital rates, and (c) the correlations among the deviations from the average vital rate 
trends in different world regions. The forecasts of the world’s population used in this 
paper assume: (1) a zero correlation between fertility and mortality deviations from their 
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trends within regions, (2) a 31 term moving average specification separately for fertility 
and mortality deviations, which implies an autocorrelation between deviations one year 
apart of around 0.96, and (3) cross-regional correlations of fertility and mortality 
deviations within each year of 0.7 and 0.9, respectively. This methodology is 
considerably different from the one used in Lutz et al. (1996, 1997), where piecewise 
linear paths for future vital rates were used. 
Because of temporal and regional correlations, vital rates paths for all regions 
are determined simultaneously and then used to make population forecasts, which were 
aggregated to the world total. This process was repeated 2,000 times, generating a 
distribution of world population sizes for each year from 2001 to 2100. 
Conditional Probabilistic Forecasting and Scenario Analysis 
One important audience for probabilistic forecasts is the user community. Often when 
demographers want to communicate the importance of particular variables in their 
forecasts to members of this community, they use scenarios. In population forecasting, 
scenarios are typically clear “if...then” statements in which the implications of a certain 
set of assumptions on fertility, mortality and migration are being demonstrated (Lutz 
1995). Such scenarios can illustrate the laws of population dynamics but do not give the 
user any information about the likelihood of the described path. For instance, an 
immediate replacement fertility scenario merely shows what would happen if fertility 
immediately jumped to the replacement level without saying that this is a likely or even 
plausible path. For policy makers who want to know what would be the long-term 
consequences of alternative fertility trends resulting from alternative policies, for 
example, such scenarios can nonetheless be useful guides. Conditional probabilistic 
forecasting is a way of posing and answering the same type of question within a 
probabilistic framework. 
The first discussion of conditional probabilistic population forecasts, of which 
we are aware, appears in Alho (1997). Alho first turned the deterministic world 
population forecasts in Lutz et al. (1994) into a probabilistic one and computed the 
probability of the world’s population falling between the high and low scenarios. Next, 
Alho considered the case where the UN’s world population forecasts for 2025 could be 
regarded as a Lutz et al. (1994) forecast conditional on the success of family planning 
programs. Alho showed that if the probability of being between the UN’s high and low 
variants was 75 percent, then those programs would have to reduce the variance of the 
probabilistic version of the Lutz et al. (1994) forecasts by at least 42 percent. Alho 
regards this as “much too high to be credible” in light “of the past record of 
ineffectiveness of government interventions concerning fertility in the industrialized 
countries” (p. 83). He showed that if the reduction in the variance were less than 42 
percent, then the probability content of the interval between the UN high and low 
variants must be less than 75 percent. 
Alho (1997) is an example of taking known unconditional and conditional 
distributions and learning about the nature of the conditional distribution by studying 
the plausibility of the conditions needed to obtain it from the unconditional one. Here an 
example that is at the other end of the continuum is presented. Starting with 
unconditional distributions and conditions that are of interest to policy makers, the 
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example demonstrates how probabilistic forecasting can produce conditional 
distributions that are useful in scenario analysis. There are many possible intermediate 
cases as well, where information about some aspects of conditional distributions and 
some features of the conditions themselves are combined in order to investigate 
particular questions. An example of this can be found in O’Neill (2003). 
The approach used here was developed in Sanderson et al. (forthcoming). An 
application on whether immigration can compensate for Europe’s low fertility appears 
in Lutz and Scherbov (2002). The example begins with Figure 1, which shows the 
distribution of the world’s population in 2050 conditional on average fertility and 
mortality levels for the world over the period 2000-2050. The x-axis is divided into 
three ranges labeled “low fertility,” “medium fertility,” and “high fertility.” Low 
fertility includes all of the 2,000 simulated futures where the average total fertility rate 
in 2000-2050 was below 1.6. Medium fertility includes those paths where the average 
total fertility rate was between 1.6 and 1.8; and high fertility includes paths in which the 
average total fertility rate (over the whole projection period) was above 1.8. 
 
 
Figure 1. Median and interdecile ranges for the world population, conditional on three 
alternative fertility and mortality levels. The three lines within each category refer to the 
low (left), central (middle), and high (right) groups of life expectancy. Source: Authors’ 
calculations. 
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Within each of the three panels there are three lines that have different symbols 
near their centers. The lines with the diamonds near their centers refer to paths where 
the global average life expectancy at birth was lower than 68 years. The lines with the 
dented squares refer to paths where the average life expectancy was between 68 and 71, 
and the lines with triangle shapes to paths with average life expectancies over 71. The 
aggregations of the total fertility rates and life expectancies at birth were chosen so that 
one-third of our paths was in each group. The symbols are placed at the medians of the 
distributions. The circles at the endpoints of the lines indicate the 80 percent prediction 
intervals. 
Now we are in the position to answer some “what-if”-type questions. For 
example, what would be the effect on world population size in 2050 of high fertility 
trends versus low fertility trends over the coming decades combined with the medium 
range of uncertainty for future mortality? We can immediately read the answer off the 
figure. In the middle group, the median population of the world in 2050, if we 
experienced low fertility, would be around 7.7 billion people with the 80 percent 
prediction interval covering the range 7.0 to 8.3 billion people. If we experienced a high 
fertility world, the median population would be considerably higher, around 10.0 billion 
people, with a prediction interval between 9.0 and 10.9 billion people. The difference 
between the medians is 2.3 billion people, which is quite large considering that the 
median of the unconditional population distribution is 8.8 billion people. Clearly, the 
difference in fertility is very significant. 
We can also read the figure to tell us about the influence of differences in life 
expectancies on future population size. We can do this easily by looking at the middle 
panel, labeled “medium fertility.” When life expectancies are in the low group, the 
median population size is 8.3 billion. When they are in the high group, the median 
population is 9.2 billion. Therefore, in 2050 the effect on population size of moving 
from low to high fertility, keeping life expectancy constant, is much larger than the 
effect of moving from low to high life expectancy, keeping fertility constant. 
Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1, except that it deals with the proportion 60 years 
and above. As fertility increases, the proportion 60 and above decreases, but as life 
expectancy increases, the proportion gets larger. Let us consider the difference in the 
proportion due to having high fertility as opposed to low fertility, again assuming 
medium life expectancy. The median proportion is 25 percent when fertility is low and 
around 19 percent when it is high. Assuming medium fertility and varying mortality, we 
see that when mortality is low the proportion is below 20 percent, compared to 24 
percent when mortality is high. Thus, the effects of fertility and mortality are more 
similar in determining the proportion 60 and above than they are in determining 
population size. 
The two examples in this section show that in making the transition from 
deterministic to probabilistic forecasting, we do not have to give up on answering the 
kinds of “what-if” questions that users and policy makers so often pose. 
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Figure 2. Median and interdecile ranges for the global proportion above age 60, 
conditional on three alternative fertility and mortality levels. The three lines within each 
category refer to the low (left), central (middle), and high (right) groups of life 
expectancy. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Conditional Probabilistic Forecasts with Future Jump-Off Dates 
In many policy areas, we come across the question: Should we act now or should we 
wait until we learn more? Waiting has a cost because it can foreclose certain policy 
options or make them more expensive. On the other hand, by waiting policy makers 
could possibly acquire important and relevant information, and avoid potentially 
unnecessary policy interventions. Since population is an important driver of many 
processes, it is valuable to know how much the demographic outlook might change if 
we wait. 
For example, the question of whether to act now or wait to learn more is central 
to the debate over climate change policy. The climate change issue is characterized by 
both long timescales – today’s emissions of greenhouse gases will affect climate for 
decades to centuries – and substantial uncertainties in climate impacts on society and 
costs of emissions reductions. Many argue that it would be beneficial to wait to learn 
more (and reduce uncertainties) before deciding whether, and how much, to reduce 
emissions. This strategy would avoid investments in emissions reductions that may turn 
out to be unnecessary. Others argue that reductions should begin now, because if 
climate change turns out to be serious, we would later regret not acting early. The 
question of how the potential for learning about various aspects of the problem affects 
today’s optimal decision remains unresolved (Webster 2002). It is possible that learning 
about the outlook for future population growth could impact such decisions. Population 
is one factor affecting the outlook for future greenhouse gas emissions. If, by waiting a 
decade or two, we learn that population is likely to be much lower in the future than we 
currently expect, our outlook for future emissions will likely also be revised downward, 
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reducing the urgency of emissions reductions. If we learn that population is likely to be 
much higher, our outlook for emissions will also be higher, justifying more aggressive 
action to reduce emissions. 
Probabilistic forecasts with future jump-off dates are constructed to help us learn 
about the value of waiting for more information. These forecasts are, of course, 
conditional on what happens between the beginning of the current forecast period and 
the future jump-off date. For example, imagine that it is the year 2000 and forecasts are 
made of the distribution of the size of the world’s population in 2050. How different 
would the forecasted distribution of population sizes be in 2050 if the forecast were 
made in 2010 instead of 2000? We do not have to wait to 2010 to answer this question. 
The technique of making probabilistic forecasts with future jump-off dates allows us to 
think about this question now. 
Projections in 2010 may differ from projections in 2000 because something is 
learned between now and then. At a minimum, the values of demographic variables like 
population size, fertility, mortality, and migration in that ten-year period will be 
observed. Other factors such as new policies, economic trends, or social conditions that 
are relevant to the outlook for future demographic rates will also be observed. It is 
possible as well that demographic theory will be improved through research, that new 
breakthroughs in health (or new epidemics of disease) will occur, or that new 
contraceptive technology will be developed. All of these types of learning could change 
the outlook for the future. Learning based on these other factors is not considered here. 
In the example below, learning is only based on the observation of demographic 
variables. While learning by observation is only one type of learning, it is likely to be an 
important one in population projections. 
In this section, we take some small first steps toward understanding how this 
passive learning process takes place, so that users of forecasts are not surprised when 
forecasts change and so that policy makers can use probabilistic forecasts in the design 
of adaptive policies. 
Let us imagine that it is now 2010 and all the relevant population information 
has been compiled and is available. Certainly it would be appropriate to make new 
forecasts, even if the methodology and assumptions that were originally used were 
completely correct. The forecasts based in 2010 would take into account what actually 
happened between 2000 and 2010. Without actually making new forecasts, the 
projections made in 2000 could be used to anticipate what new projections would look 
like. 
In order to make this inquiry practical, a very simple approach will be used here. 
Instead of observing exact population characteristics, the assumption is made that only 
whether or not global population size is above or below the median of its distribution 
can be observed. There is nothing theoretically attractive in dividing the observations 
into only two groups in 2010, but it makes this introduction to passive demographic 
learning as simple as possible. 
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Table 1. Forecasted distributions of the world’s population size beginning in 2000 and beginning in 2010. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
World (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A:  2000 Jump-Off Date 
      
 Below 6 6 to 7 7 to 8 8 to 9 9 to 10 10 to 11 11 to 12 Above 12 Median RIDR*
2000 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 6055 0
2010 0 85.05 14.95 0 0 0 0 0 6828 0.062
2020 0 8.05 81.45 10.5 0 0 0 0 7538 0.129
2030 0.1 3.05 41.85 47.35 7.5 0.15 0 0 8085 0.195
2040 0.15 3.75 24.85 40.25 25.15 5.2 0.65 0 8525 0.27
2050 0.5 5.05 18.95 30.95 26.8 13.45 3.3 1 8796 0.352
2060 1.55 7 17.45 25.75 22.35 16.25 6.45 3.2 8935 0.427
2070 4 8.35 16.9 21.2 19.9 15.05 8.5 6.1 8974 0.52
2080 6.8 10.1 16 18.45 18.45 12.55 9 8.65 8890 0.606
2090 10 12.75 14.85 17.9 15 12.25 6.45 10.8 8678 0.702
2100 14.25 14.05 14.45 16.5 12.9 10.45 6.85 10.55 8413 0.779
* Relative Interdecile Range (RIDR) is measured as the difference between the ninth decile and the first decile divided by  the median.
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World (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel B:  2010 Jump-Off Date 
      
 Below 6 6 to 7 7 to 8 8 to 9 9 to 10 10 to 11 11 to 12 Above 12 Median RIDR*
2020/L 0 16.1 83.9 0 0 0 0 0 7268 0.088
2020/H 0 0 79 21 0 0 0 0 7787 0.081
2030/L 0.2 6.1 70.3 23.4 0 0 0 0 7704 0.147
2030/H 0 0 13.4 71.3 15 0.3 0 0 8486 0.139
2040/L 0.3 7.5 42.3 42.4 7.4 0.1 0 0 7996 0.224
2040/H 0 0 7.4 38.1 42.9 10.3 1.3 0 9083 0.216
2050/L 1 9.9 31.1 36.6 17.9 3.2 0.3 0 8152 0.294
2050/H 0 0.2 6.8 25.3 35.7 23.7 6.3 2 9521 0.279
2060/L 3.1 12.8 26.9 31.3 17.3 6.8 1.6 0.2 8256 0.389
2060/H 0 1.2 8 20.2 27.4 25.7 11.3 6.2 9760 0.352
2070/L 7.8 13.6 23.9 25.2 17.4 8.7 1.9 1.5 8213 0.485
2070/H 0.2 3.1 9.9 17.2 22.4 21.4 15.1 10.7 9891 0.438
2080/L 12.5 14.7 22.2 19.8 16.9 7.9 4.1 1.9 8045 0.568
2080/H 1.1 5.5 9.8 17.1 20 17.2 13.9 15.4 9816 0.536
2090/L 16.1 18 18.5 18.3 13.3 9.4 3.6 2.8 7888 0.641
2090/H 3.9 7.5 11.2 17.5 16.7 15.1 9.3 18.8 9638 0.647
2100/L 22 17.7 16.6 17.6 9.9 9 3.6 3.6 7652 0.716
2100/H 6.5 10.4 12.3 15.4 15.9 11.9 10.1 17.5 9328 0.734
* Relative Interdecile Range (RIDR) is measured as the difference between the ninth decile and the first decile divided by the median. 
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Table 1 consists of two panels. Panel A provides the distributions of future 
world population size expressed in intervals below 6 billion, 6 to 7 billion, 7 to 8 
billion, and so on with the uppermost interval being above 12 billion. The numbers in 
the cells are the percentages of our 2,000 simulated future population paths. Median 
population sizes are in column 9. The tenth column contains an uncertainty measure, 
the relative interdecile range (RIDR) defined as the difference between the ninth 
decile and the first decile of the distribution divided by the median. 
Panel B is based on a division of the 2010 distribution into population paths 
that were above the median in that year and those that were below it. There are 1,000 
observations in each of these subgroups. There are two rows in Panel B for each 
decade following 2010, one labeled with an “L” and another with an “H.” The “L” 
rows are the population distributions at the indicated date for the observations that 
were below the median in 2010 and the “H” rows are from the paths that were above 
the median in 2010. 
One disadvantage of this very simplified example is that the forecasts with 
jump-off dates in 2000 and 2010 are not exactly comparable. The vital rate paths used 
in the 2000 forecasts all start at their observed values, while the paths in forecasts that 
have the 2010 jump-off date have a distribution of starting values. One way of testing 
the plausibility of this example is to consider the uncertainty of forecasts of various 
durations based on a jump-off date of 2000 and a jump-off date of 2010. Holding 
duration constant, the example would be questionable if the uncertainties of N year 
ahead forecasts were very different depending on whether they were made in 2000 or 
2010. When the jump-off date is the year 2000 and a forecast is made for 10 years 
into the future, the uncertainty measure in 2010 is 0.062, which can be read off the 
row in Panel A labeled 2010. In the case of a forecast made10 years ahead based on 
being below the median in 2010, the uncertainty measure in 2020 is 0.088. This can 
be read off the row in Panel B labeled 2020/L. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of the Relative Interdecile Ranges (RIDR) for forecasts made 
for 10 through 90 years ahead starting from 2000 and starting from an observation 
either above the median or below the median in 2010. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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The uncertainty measures for 10- through 90-year ahead forecasts based on 
2000 and the two sub-samples from 2010 are shown in Figure 3. The results from the 
two 2010 groups track those from 2000 quite well, but are always slightly higher than 
the uncertainty measures based on 2000. Figure 3 is what is expected given the 
construction of the example and it suggests that it is plausible to proceed. 
The median population forecast for 2100 based on information up to 2000 is 
8.414 billion people. After a 10-year wait, the median forecast for 2100, based on 
being above or below the median in 2010, would either be 7.652 billion or 9.328 
billion. It would seem that if anyone were to predict 914 million more people in the 
world in 2100 from the perspective of 2010, the forecaster must have made a big 
mistake in 2000. Yet, this could well happen even if the methodology is 
probabilistically correct. A prediction of a 2100 population size in 2010 that is 762 
million smaller than the one that was predicted in 2000 is also easily possible. These 
are substantial differences. Clearly, forecasts of the future will be different in 2010 
than they are today. One interesting feature of probabilistic forecasting is that it can 
give us some idea about how much different future forecasts could be from current 
ones, and with what likelihood. 
Population size in 2010 has such a persistent effect because of a number of 
factors. First, past population size influences future population size. Paths that yield 
large populations in 2010 will also yield large populations in 2100, even if population 
growth rates after 2010 are the same. Second, some populations are large in 2010 
because they had high fertility rates. These high fertility rates alter the age structure of 
the population making it younger. Younger populations tend to grow more, other 
things being equal, a process that demographers call “population momentum.” 
Fertility and mortality themselves have persistence built into them. The persistence of 
fertility and mortality means that on paths where fertility was high and mortality was 
low, leading to relatively large populations in 2010, they are likely to remain high and 
low respectively for a while. The effects of the persistence of fertility and mortality 
over time are compounded by the relatively high interregional correlations of fertility 
and mortality, by the persistence caused by population momentum, and by the size 
effect itself. 
It is crucially important that attention be given not only to the effects of the 
passage of time on the median forecast, but to the entire distribution of forecasted 
population sizes. Most of the differences in the distributions based on the paths above 
and below the median in 2010 are in the extremes (tails) of the distributions. For 
example, 6.5 percent of the paths that were above the median in 2010 resulted in 
populations of less than 6 billion in 2100, compared to 22.0 percent of the paths that 
were below the median in 2010. The difference at the high end of the distribution is 
even more striking. Over 17 percent of the paths that were above the median in 2010 
ended the century with 12 billion people or more. In contrast only 3.6 percent of the 
paths that were below the median in 2010 did so. 
This has been a very short and simplified presentation of the basic concepts of 
conditional probabilistic forecasting with future jump-off dates. It is meant only to be 
suggestive. This analysis of learning with the passage of time has illustrated how 
sensitive the long-term population outlook is to near-term trends. It can also help to 
understand why projections of population size in 2100 have changed so significantly 
over the past 10 years. We have simply learned a great deal over the past decade. 
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During this decade population growth has been lower than originally expected and 
this has significantly decreased our new long-term expectations. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Conditional probabilistic projections represent a way to combine the benefits of 
probabilistic projections, particularly the quantification of uncertainty, with the 
benefits of alternative scenarios, which give clear indications of the sensitivity of 
results to underlying assumptions. We have shown that the same kinds of conclusions 
about, for example, the relative importance of fertility and mortality trends to 
population size outcomes can be drawn using conditional probabilistic forecasts as 
can be drawn using alternative deterministic scenarios. An added benefit is that the 
conditional probabilistic forecasts provide an estimate of the likelihood of the 
underlying demographic conditions, as well as an estimate of their effect on 
outcomes. These projections can be extremely useful to both the research and policy 
communities. For instance, many analyses of the potential for long-term 
environmental change are based on the approach of considering a set of alternative 
future scenarios conditional on different sets of assumptions about future 
development. The scenario approach dominates as a response to deep uncertainty 
about the many socioeconomic, technological, and environmental factors that must be 
included in such analyses. Conditional probabilistic projections present a possible 
means of retaining some of the advantages of the probabilistic approach without 
discarding the benefits of conditional scenarios (see O’Neill 2003 for an example). 
Probabilistic projections with future jump-off dates, which are conditional on 
how population characteristics evolve between now and the future jump-off date, 
present a new way to address an important set of research questions that are also 
policy relevant. They provide a means of anticipating how our forecasts might change 
in the future and how likely those changes appear to be at the moment. These kinds of 
analyses cannot be done deterministically. Because there can be costs and benefits to 
changes in the outlook for the future, these projections could have interesting new 
applications. For example in the climate change issue, the prospects of learning about 
technological costs, or about physical aspects of the climate system, have been 
incorporated into analyses of whether it is better to act now or to wait to learn more. 
However as far as we are aware, no such analysis – for climate change or any other 
issue – has been performed taking into account the prospects for learning about the 
outlook for population. 
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